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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs. : 
DOUGLAS REX YOUNG, : Case No. 14531 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of aggravated robbery 
in the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried and convicted by a jury of the crime of 
aggravated burglary, a violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203 (1973 
as amended). Following his conviction, appellant was sentenced to 
the indeterminate term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison, 
where he is presently incarcerated. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks remand of the case for a new trial or, in 
the alternative, a reduction in degree of the conviction to the crime 
of burglary, a second degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-202 (1973 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At 12:30 p.m. on November 13, 1975 Mr. John Snyder, 
manager of an apartment complex in Salt Lake City, and his wife 
were returning home when they passed in the apartment walkway 
an individual later identified to be the defendant (T. 24,25). 
After entering their apartment on the top floor of the nine-unit 
complex, Mr. Snyder heard a jarring noise coming from the bottom-
floor apartment of Miss Lynette Ross (T.26). Mr. Snyder instructed 
his wife to call the police. He left his apartment, ran out of the 
building and around to the patio area of apartment number 3, belonging 
to Miss Ross. Through the closed sliding galss doors that separate 
the patio area from the interior of the apartment Mr. Snyder observed 
a man, whom he identified to be the appellant, dash out of a 
bedroom inside the apartment (T.35), The man jumped up on a kitchen 
counter and tried to open a window on the opposite side of the 
building, but was unsuccessful. Mr. Snyder then ram around to the 
front of the building, looked through the window, and observed an 
empty apartment. He then ran to the front of another building and 
observed the appellant running west down a small alleyway. Mr. 
Snyder pursued him across two adjoining lawns, then overtook and 
subdued him. 
Mr. Snyder grabbed his arms and forced them behind appellant's 
back, then escorted him to the front lawn area of the apartment 
house. When they arrived, Mr. Snyder attempted to force appellant 
to the ground; Mrs. Snyder announced that the "police were on the 
way/1 (T. 32). When Mr. Snyder attempted to force the face of 
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appellant into canine excrement on the grass (T. 115), appellant 
began to struggle with Mr. Snyder. Mr. Snyder was subsequently 
struck in the nose, A pocket knife was produced from appellant's 
pocket and he loosed himself from the control of Mr. and Mrs. 
Snyder. Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Snyder was cut by the knife in the 
struggle. Followed at a distance of fifteen feet by Mr. Snyder, 
appellant ran to his automobile and drove away, but not before 
Mr. Snyder was able to obtain the vehicle license number. 
Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with aggravated 
burglary. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE 
CONDUCT SOUGHT TO BE PROSCRIBED BY THE LEGISLATURE IN ENACTING 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-6-203 (1973 AS AMENDED). 
A. SECTION 76-6-203 DOES NOT APPLY TO THE CASE AT BAR 
BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT "ATTEMPTING, COMMITTING, OR FLEEING 
FROM A BURGLARY.'f 
The appellant was not "fleeing" from a burglary when the 
injury to Mr. Snyder occurred; his flight had been terminated by 
his capture. He peacefully accompanied Mr. Snyder back to the 
apartment house. It was not until Mr. Snyder used excessive force 
upon the Defendant that he resisted and, in self defense, initiated 
the struggle wherein Mr. Snyder was injured. 
Appellant does not deny that the above struggle with Mr. 
Snyder took place; he does, however, disavow any participation in 
the burglary of Miss Ross1 apartment. Appellant testified he was 
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innocently at that location looking for a friend's apartment and that 
he ran out of instinct (T. 122). The struggle with Mr. Snyder, 
resulting in his escape, was only initiated after the enraged Mr. 
Snyder would not explain to the appellant the reasons for his actions 
when he tried to force the appellantfs face into canine excrement 
on the lawn. 
B. SECTION 76-6-203 DOES NOT APPLY TO THE CASE AT BAR 
BECAUSE A POCKET KNIFE, AS WAS USED IN THIS CASE, IS NOT A DANGEROUS 
WEAPON. 
Defendant submits that the Legislature, in enacting Section 
76-6-203, intended to punish more severely the carrying of a 
weapon during the commission of a burglary. This is due to the 
peculiar nature of the crime of burglary; it is not an offense 
wherein a person's life is necessarily endangered. But if a 
weapon is used or carried during the attempt, commission, or 
flight from the burglary, human life may be endangered. Since 
burglary is committed predominently in situations involving stealth and 
secrecy, being caught in the act is certainly likely to cause the 
burglar to become surpirsed. Where there is a dangerous weapon which 
may be used to assist him in continuing his crime or fleeing therefrom, 
the danger to human life is present. This goes well beyond the initial 
purpose of the crime (i.e. to commit a burglary); it is the potential 
situation where a burglar—frightened and surprised by his discovery 
and impending capture— irrationally uses the weapon he has 
procurred for that purpose. This the evil the Legislature has 
proscribed in Section 76-6-203. 
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Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302, (1973 as amended) defining the 
crime of aggravated robbery, conditions that crime upon the use of 
a "firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a 
knife or a deadly weapon; . . . "Thus, the use of a pocket, knife 
in a robbery clearly aggravates that crime to that of aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony. It is important to note that 
in this section the legislature was very explicit (i.e. firearms, 
knives, and their facsimiles, and other "dangerous weapons") 
in specifying how the crime of robbery is elevated to that of 
aggravated robbery. 
In defining aggravated burglary in Section 76-6-203(b) 
the Legislature used only the words "dangerous or deadly weapon." 
Defendant submits that such language indicates a two part legis-
lative intent: first, to utilize the statutory [§76-1-601(10)] 
definition of "deadly weapon" in applying the aggravated burglary 
statute; secondly, to avoid characterizing a "knife" as a "deadly 
weapon" as a matter of law. 
The aggravated robbery statute §76-6-302 makes such a charact-
erization; using even a facsimile of a knife aggravates the crime of 
robbery. If in all situations a knife were intended by the Legis-
lature to be cause for aggravating the crime of burglary, it could 
have easily chosen wording similar to that used in Section 76-6-302. 
It did not do so—most likely because it did not want to make the 
similar characterization. 
The Legislature has defined "deadly or dangerous weapon" 
to mean: 
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. . . anything that in the manner of its use or intended 
use is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury." 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201 (1973 as amended) and Utah Code 
Ann. §76-1-601(10) (1973 as amended) containing the specific 
definitions to be used in the burglary sections of the Penal Code, 
does not redefine "deadly or dangerous weapon.11 Thus, for the purposes 
of aggravated burglary, the definition contained in Section 76-1-601 
(10) must be applied. 
Clearly a pocket knife is not per se a "dangerous weapon." 
Unlike a firearm, the usual purpose of which is to cause "death 
or serious bodily injury", a pocket knife has many uses— woodcarving, 
sharpening pencils, cleaning fingernails, improvised screwdriver, 
and so forth— for which it can be casually and innocently carried and 
used. It must be admitted that a pocket knife may be used in a 
manner of use or intended use which is capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury; but such a characterization could be applied 
to any item (a crowbar, screwdriver, even furniture or lamps 
which might be used to strike someone on the head). The screwdriver 
carried by a burglar to pry open a door, when used to stab a person 
in the abdomen or chest, could cause "death or serious bodily injury" 
and would thus become a "deadly weapon." But such a screwdriver 
would not justify a prosecution for "aggravated" burglary unless that 
item were actually used in a manner "likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury;" merely carrying the item during the commission of 
the crime is insufficient aggravation. 
Courts have consistently refused to characterize pocket 
knives as dangerous weapons. See for example Blount v. State, 
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376 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964). In Blount, the Texas 
court held that a pocket knife six inches long, used to produce 
several wounds, the longest of which was two and one half inches 
long, in the victim, was not a "deadly weapon'1 for the purposes 
of an assault with intent to commit murder statute. However, 
there are other jurisdictions which have declared that knives — 
to include pocket knives— are "dangerous weapons when used in the 
commission of a crime. See for example State v. Williams, 110 Ariz. 
104, 515 P.2d 849 (1973). Appellant submits that most of the cases 
wherein courts of other jurisdictions have characterized pocket 
knives as dangerous weapons have involved robberies or assaults in 
which the knife has been used as an offensive weapon. This is 
likewise the result in Utah, for if a knife (or even a facsimile 
thereof) is used in a robbery, the crime is elevated to that of 
aggravated robbery. 
However, in a burglary situation, as previously noted, 
a knife is not as a matter of law a dangerous weapon; it can only 
be such if the "manner of its use or intended use is likely to 
cause death or serious bodily injury." 
In the present case appellant withdrew the knife from his 
pocket only after extensive physical abuse at the hands of Mr. 
Snyder (T. 115, 116). The knife was not used in an offensive 
manner whatsoever; it was used strictly for the self-defense of the 
Defendant. Indeed, after the knife was produced the Snydersf lost 
control of appellant and the struggle ceased; brandishing the knife, 
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the Defendant withdrew and told the Snyders to keep away. 
(T. 33) The knife was not used in stabbing, gashing, plunging, 
or any other motions associated with the use of a knife in an 
offensive attack. Indeed, neither of the two Snyders1 was even 
cut by the knife during the struggle. Clearly the appellant's 
use of the knife (in self-defense to cause cessation of the physical 
abuse by Mr. Snyder, in a non-attacking manner, while at the same time 
retreating from the struggle) cannot be so construed to be "likely 
to cause death or serious injury," as required by the statute. 
There is likewise no evidence that appellant "intended to cause" 
such injury through the use of the knife; all that was proven was that the 
appellant withdrew from the struggle and proceeded to his automobile. 
C. THE INJURY TO MR. SNYDER IS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY 
AGGRAVATION OF THE CRIME OF BURGLARY. 
During the trial Mr. Snyder testified that during the 
struggle, the Defendant punched him in the nose, for which he 
received medical treatment. (T.35) Defendant submits that this type 
of injury does not fall within the type of injury covered in 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203(1) (a) (1973 as amended). As will be 
discussed below, the proposed jury instruction which was not given 
would have cured any defects. The jury would have been instructed 
that the appellant could not have been found guilty of aggravated 
burglary if his actions (punching Mr. Snyder in the nose) were 
used only after unnecessary and unreasonable force was used against 
him. At the time Mr. Snyder was struck in the nose, no knife had 
been produced. Mr. Snyder had previously subdued the appellant 
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twice— once at the point of apprehension and once upon the return 
to the lawn area of the complex. Mr. Snyder had the appellant in a 
full-Nelson hold before he broke free. When Mr. Snyder attempted 
to grab hold of him again, he was punched in the nose. Appellant 
would argue that he has a right of self defense; a right to use 
reasonable force to defend himself against another's imminent use 
of unlawful force against him. A punch in the nose is certainly 
not escalating the amount of force used in the struggle; appellant 
had been on the "receiving end" of the struggle twice before. 
Surely this single punch in the nose, and resultant injury to Mr. 
Snyder, cannot be construed to be within the intent of the 
Legislature in defining "aggravated burglary." 
POINT II 
THE APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL BY THE 
TRIAL COURTTS REFUSAL TO GIVE A PROFFERED JURY INSTRUCTION 
REGARDING THE USE OF FORCE IN A SELF-DEFENSE SITUATION. 
During the trial the trial judge instructed the jury: 
• INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
You are instructed that a person is justified in threatening 
or using force against another when and to the extent that 
he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to 
defend himself against another's imminent use of unlawful 
force; however, a person is justified in using a force which 
is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily 
injury only if he reasonably believes that the force is 
necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to 
himself. 
A person is not justified in using force if he is 
attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the 
commission or attempted commission~ of a felony. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
Any person is justified in using any force, except 
deadly force, which he reasonably believes to be necessary 
to effect an arrest or to defend himself from bodily 
harm when making an arrest. 
Appellant, in a timely and appropriate manner, moved 
(T. 130) to have the trial court include the following instruction: 
Even though you are instructed that a person is not 
justified in using force or threats against another when he 
is fleeing after the commission of a felony, if you find 
from your deliberations that force or threats were used 
by the defendant, Douglas Rex Young, only after unnecessary 
and unreasonable force was used against him, and if you 
find that Douglas Rex Young did in fact commit the crime of 
burglary, then you may find the defendant'guilty of the 
crime of burglary of a Dwelling, a felony of the second 
degree, but not guilty of the crime of Aggravated Burglary, 
a felony of the first degree. 
The trial judge refused to give this instruction and the Defendant 
took proper exception to that decision. (T. 168). 
This refusal deprived appellant of his right to a fair trial 
because it withdrew from the province of the jury the opportunity 
to determine whether or not the appellant's actions were justified; 
it deprived the appellant of his right to have the jury determine 
his theory of the case. 
In State v. Evans, 74 Utah 389, 279 Pac. 950 (1929), the 
Utah Supreme Court was confronted with a similar situation. In that 
case, involving a burglary conviction, the defendant appealed his 
conviction on the basis inter alia of "the refusal of the court 
to give certain requested instructions submitted by defendant; . . ." 
(supra 279 Pac. at 952). Those instructions specifically 
detailed the intent possessed by the defendant requisite to a 
conviction for burglary. Defendant had asserted a defense of honest 
belief that he had a right to the property later determined to belong 
-10-
to another. In reversing the conviction, the court held that the 
given instruction did not 
flproperly reflect the appellant's theory . . . The 
appellant was entitled* to have his theory . . . go to 
the jury in the form of a proper instruction from the court, 
properly reflecting appellant's theory upon this essential 
fact, whether or not the appellant believed he had a right 
to enter, which the jury must find before it could render 
a verdict. 
The instruction given by the court did not properly 
and fully inform the jury upon the law or this point" 
279 P. at 952, 953. 
Throughout the trial appellant asserted that the knife was 
drawn and the threats were made only after unreasonable force 
was being applied to him (T. 116). The principal witness for 
the State, Mr. Snyder, testified on cross-examination that he 
"walked11 appellant back to the apartments. (T. 47) Only after 
Mr. Snyder attempted to place appellant in a lying-down position 
(T. 47) did he begin to struggle. . On direct examination 
(T. 31) Mr. Snyder testified that after he had overtaken appellant 
some distance away from the burglarized apartment, he tackled 
him. He (Snyder) testified (T. 31): "After I knocked him down, 
I got up very quietly and told him to stay there." Question 
(by Deputy County Attorney): "What did he do?" Answer (by Mr. 
Snyder): He stayed there, muttered some words." 
Mr. Snyder then escorted him back to the front lawn area 
of the apartment complex. Snyder then instructed him to lay on the 
front lawn of the apartment building. When he "didn't want to," 
Snyder "pushed" him down by applying "pressure downward ro make him 
bend his knees and get down." (T.32) At this point a struggle ensued, 
wherein Mr. Snyder was struck in the nose. Shortly thereafter 
appellant removed from his pocket a knife (T. 116) and told Mr. Snyder 
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and his wife to keep away. (T. 34). 
Appellant admitted that he was involved in such an altercation 
with Mr. Snyder; however, he claimed that the altercation was the 
result of a case of mistaken identity. Appellant produced the 
knife only after Mr. Snyder had struck him "quite a few times11 
(T. 127). Appellant's account of the force used upon him by Mr. 
Snyder is found at (T. 115, 116). 
Instruction Numbers 19 and 20 are correct assertions of the 
law as applied to usual cases. However, when applied to this case, 
the given instructions do not "properly and fully inform the jury 
upon the law or this point." Evans, supra. Appellant submits that 
the intent of the legislature is not being followed by the refusal 
of the proposed instruction. First, for the reasons enumerated in 
Point I above, appellant's actions do not fall within the statutory 
proscription; and secondly, the legislature intended to punish 
(by the aggravated burglary statute) only those who would use force 
or dangerous weapons to assist in their escape; it cannot be applied 
to one who would use such a method to assist in his being freed from 
an enraged person who was physically assaulting him. 
As previously stated, appellant feels that Insturctions 19 
and 20 are correct assertions of the law— at least for cases unlike 
the present case. The second paragraph of Instruction 19 states: 
A person is not justified in using force if he is 
attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the 
commission or attempted commission of a felony. 
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The statutory basis for such a jury instruction is found 
in Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402(b) (1973 as amended). However, the 
refusal of the trial court to give the proposed instruction 
substantially prejudiced appellant. When the second paragraph of 
Instruction 19 is considered, and there is no qualifying or 
conditional language as is found in the proposed jury instruction, 
then appellant is almost automatically convicted of aggravated 
burglary. Surely this cannot be the intent of the legislature. 
To allow such an interpretation of the statute is in essence 
saying the following: any person charged with simple burglary cannot 
use any force whatsoever— in self defense or even in defense of his 
own life—-to oppose unlawful force imposed upon him by an arresting 
citizen, without risking prosecution for aggravated burglary if that 
arresting person is in some way injured. In the context of this 
particular case, where the injury to Mr. Snyder and the use of the 
knife by appellant are crucial to the case, in that they are necessary 
to prove the aggravation of the crime, such an error is clearly 
harmful to the defendant. He ought to be entitled to have the jury 
decide whether or not his actions of self-defense were reasonable 
and justified. The proposed jury instruction would have helped the 
jury to decide the case properly. Here the use of force by the 
appellant is critical to the crime: if justified in his use thereof, 
he cannot be convicted of aggravated burglary. This case is unique 
in this respect, because for most other crimes appellant's actions 
(in using force) during the crime or at the time of flight have no 
real bearing on the prosecution for that crime (even though a separate 
crime of assault would be involved). 
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Appellant would submit that the legislature, in enacting 
Utah Code Ann. §§76-2-402(15) (L973 as amended) and 76-6-203(1) 
(1973 as anlended) , did not intend to deprive suspected persons of the 
right to self defense against the unreasonable use of force. 
The given jury instructions had that effect. That error could 
have been cured had appellant's proposed instruction been given, 
but it was not. Such prejudicial error requires reversal of the 
conviction and a retrial of the case. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, appellant respectfully requests that the 
conviction be reversed and the case be remanded for retrial allowing 
the jury to consider appellant's theory of the case. In the alter-
native, the appellant seeks a reduction in sentence to that for simple 
burglary, a second-degree felony. 
DATED this day of August, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted 
LARRY R. KELLER 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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